Who controls the Strait of Hormuz?
There are two answers and they no longer agree. The legal answer has not changed in forty years. The practical answer changed in February 2026.
Reviewed 9 November 2026
| Measure | Figure |
|---|---|
| Legal regime | Transit passage under UNCLOS Part III |
| May a coastal state suspend it? | No |
| Iran’s UNCLOS status | Signed 1982, never ratified |
| Oman’s UNCLOS status | Ratified |
| Practical control since Feb 2026 | Iran — IRGC Navy |
| Permit authority | Persian Gulf Strait Authority, created 5 May 2026 |
| Islands controlled by Iran | Seven of the eight major islands |
| US naval posture | Blockade of Iranian ports, in force since 14 July 2026 |
The legal position
The Strait of Hormuz is the standard illustration of a problem the law of the sea was written to solve. When states extended their territorial seas to twelve nautical miles, straits narrower than twenty-four miles ceased to have any high-seas corridor through the middle — and Hormuz, at 21 nautical miles at its narrowest, is one of them. Without a special rule, the bordering states would have acquired a veto over a significant share of world trade.
The rule is transit passage, set out in Part III of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In a strait used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas or exclusive economic zones, ships and aircraft of all states enjoy continuous and expeditious passage, and the bordering states may not hamper or suspend it. They may adopt sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, but only through the IMO, and they may not levy charges for passage as such.
That is a stronger right than innocent passage, which applies in ordinary territorial seas and which a coastal state can suspend temporarily. Transit passage cannot be suspended at all, which is the entire point of the provision.
Iran’s objection
Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982 and never ratified it, and has consistently argued that only parties to the convention can claim the benefit of the transit passage regime — that non-parties, the United States among them, are left with innocent passage, which Iran could regulate more tightly.
The counter-argument, which nearly every other state and most scholars accept, is that transit passage reflects customary international law and binds Iran regardless of ratification, not least because Iran benefits from the same rule elsewhere. The United States has never accepted the Iranian reading and has routinely asserted transit passage rights through the strait.
This is a genuine dispute rather than a fringe position, but it is not a close-run one in terms of how many states hold each view. It is worth knowing because it is the legal scaffolding Iran has used for the permit regime.
What control looks like in practice
Since 28 February 2026 the position on the water has been straightforwardly different from the position in law. Iran closed the strait, then reframed the closure as a permissioning system, and on 5 May 2026 created the Persian Gulf Strait Authority to administer it. Vessels apply, pay, and route as directed; the IRGC Navy enforces. Iran declared a prohibited zone over the approaches on 5 September 2026.
The enforcement is not theoretical. Seventy-seven commercial vessels had been logged as attacked by 22 September 2026, with 14 seafarer deaths confirmed by the IMO in June, and the IRGC said on 8 November that three tankers making unauthorised transits had caught fire. The chronology is here.
Geography underwrites it. Iran holds the entire northern shore and seven of the eight major islands, and the routed shipping corridor is about six nautical miles wide and cannot be moved, because the water elsewhere is not reliably deep enough. A state with that coastline and those islands does not need to blockade a strait to control who uses it.
The other actors
Oman holds the southern shore and has played the position carefully. It has resisted American pressure to cut ties with Tehran while saying it has only discussed a future strait-management arrangement that would comply with international law — phrasing that conspicuously does not endorse the Iranian authority.
The United States is the external power most invested in the strait and has not asserted control of it. It ran an air campaign against coastal missile sites and fast-attack craft from March 2026, escorted some tankers, and has maintained a blockade of Iranian ports — a different object with a different legal basis. CENTCOM said in October that the blockade had halted around $25 billion of Iranian crude exports.
The IMO retains authority over routeing measures, and the traffic separation scheme in the strait remains an IMO instrument. It has no enforcement capability, which is the gap the last nine months have exposed: the body with the legal mandate has no ships, and the state with the ships has no mandate.
Common questions
- Can Iran legally close the Strait of Hormuz?
- No. Transit passage through an international strait cannot be suspended by a bordering state. Iran argues the regime does not bind it because it never ratified UNCLOS, a position almost no other state accepts — and it closed the strait in February 2026 regardless.
- Can Iran charge ships to use the Strait of Hormuz?
- Not lawfully. Charges for transit passage as such are prohibited. Iran has nonetheless charged for authorisation since 2026, and the US Treasury has warned that paying may create sanctions exposure.
- Who polices the Strait of Hormuz?
- No single authority. The IRGC Navy enforces Iran’s permit regime; UKMTO collects incident reports and issues advisories; the US Navy maintains a blockade of Iranian ports and has escorted some traffic. Routeing measures are adopted through the IMO, which has no enforcement arm.
- Does the US Navy control the Strait of Hormuz?
- No. It operates in and around the strait and has escorted tankers, but it has not attempted to force or hold the waterway. Its principal instrument through 2026 has been the blockade of Iranian ports rather than control of the strait.