What are the alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz?
By sea, none. By pipeline, about a quarter of normal volume, and one of the two main routes delivers into a waterway that is also disrupted.
Reviewed 9 November 2026
| Measure | Figure |
|---|---|
| Alternative sea route | None |
| Total available bypass capacity | 3.5–5.5 million barrels a daySaudi Arabia and UAE combined. IEA. |
| Normal transit volume | About 20 million barrels a day |
| Share coverable by pipeline | Roughly a quarter |
| Saudi East-West (Petroline) | 5 million b/d design; 3–5 spareAbout 2 million b/d in use in early 2026. Delivers to the Red Sea. |
| UAE ADCOP to Fujairah | 1.5 million b/d nameplate; up to 0.7 spareCarrying about 1.1 million b/d. Delivers outside the strait. |
| Iran, Jask terminal | 1 million b/d nominal — effectively non-operationalOnly test load was in late 2024. IEA. |
| LNG bypass capacity | Negligible |
Why there is no sea alternative
This is worth stating plainly because it is the most commonly misunderstood point about the strait. The Persian Gulf is an enclosed sea with a single opening. A cargo loaded at Ras Tanura, Kuwait, Basra, Ras Laffan or Jebel Ali has to leave through the Strait of Hormuz. There is no second channel, no canal, and no geography that could provide one.
In particular, the Cape of Good Hope is not an alternative to Hormuz. It is an alternative to the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb. A tanker rerouting round southern Africa has already left the Gulf through Hormuz before that decision arises. The distinction is set out here, and the number of otherwise careful articles that get it wrong is remarkable.
The two pipelines that do bypass it
Only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have working overland routes, which is why they are the only Gulf exporters with any flexibility at all.
- Saudi East-West Pipeline (Petroline)
- Runs from the Eastern Province across the kingdom to Red Sea terminals, principally Yanbu. Design capacity 5 million barrels a day; Aramco reported 7 million in March 2025 although sustained flows at that level are untested. About 2 million b/d was in use in early 2026, leaving 3 to 5 million spare. The catch is where it delivers — see below.
- Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP)
- Runs to Fujairah, on the Gulf of Oman side of the Musandam Peninsula, so cargo loading there is genuinely outside the strait. Nameplate 1.5 million barrels a day with about 1.8 million reported; carrying roughly 1.1 million, leaving up to 700,000 b/d of headroom. The cleanest bypass that exists.
- Saudi NGL pipeline
- 300,000 barrels a day and fully utilised, so no spare capacity to offer in a crisis.
- Iran, Jask
- A terminal on the Gulf of Oman with a nominal million barrels a day of capacity, intended precisely to bypass the strait. It is effectively non-operational — its only test load was in late 2024 — so Iran has no working alternative to a waterway it has spent 2026 controlling.
The correction that matters: the Red Sea problem
Earlier versions of this page, like most coverage of the subject, treated the East-West pipeline as a clean Hormuz bypass. It is not, and the reason became obvious in 2026.
The pipeline delivers to Red Sea terminals. A tanker loading at Yanbu and sailing for Europe or Asia must then leave the Red Sea, and the southern exit is Bab el-Mandeb — where Houthi forces took Yemen’s entire Red Sea coast in September 2026 and transits remain well below normal. The alternative is to turn north through the Suez Canal, which only helps for Mediterranean and European destinations and is itself downstream of the same risk calculus.
The arithmetic is visible in the EIA’s chokepoint data. As Hormuz flow fell from 21.6 to 4.9 million barrels a day, Bab el-Mandeb flow rose from 5.4 to 8.1 million — the Saudi rerouting showing up as additional load on a second constrained waterway. Both chokepoints at once is the real problem, and it is why bypass capacity on paper overstates the relief available in practice.
What that leaves
Against roughly 20 million barrels a day of normal transit, 3.5 to 5.5 million of pipeline capacity covers about a quarter, and part of that quarter runs into the Bab el-Mandeb constraint. Spare production capacity does not close the gap either: the IEA recorded over 4 million barrels a day of it in late 2025, mostly Saudi, but production that cannot reach a buyer is not supply.
For gas the position is worse. The Dolphin pipeline carried almost 20.5 billion cubic metres in 2025 with limited spare capacity, Oman’s LNG terminals run at close to 100 per cent utilisation, and 93 per cent of Qatar’s LNG has no route out but the strait.
The honest summary is that the alternatives mitigate a disruption rather than solve one, and that any analysis treating pipeline nameplate capacity as available relief is overstating the case twice over — once on utilisation, once on where the oil comes out.
Common questions
- Can ships avoid the Strait of Hormuz?
- Not if their cargo is loading inside the Persian Gulf. The only way to avoid the strait is for the cargo to leave the region by pipeline and load at a terminal outside it — Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, or a Saudi Red Sea port.
- Does the Cape of Good Hope route avoid the Strait of Hormuz?
- No. It avoids Suez and Bab el-Mandeb. A ship must still leave the Persian Gulf through Hormuz before the Cape route becomes relevant.
- How much oil can bypass the Strait of Hormuz?
- 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels a day of available capacity on IEA figures, against roughly 20 million of normal transit — about a quarter. Part of it delivers to Red Sea terminals whose own exit is constrained.
- Why does Iran not use the Jask terminal?
- It has a nominal million barrels a day of capacity and is effectively non-operational, with its only test load in late 2024. Iran therefore depends on the strait almost completely for its own exports.