Qatar, LNG and the Strait of Hormuz
The oil story has partial workarounds. The gas story has none, and the countries most exposed are not the ones that usually appear in coverage.
| Measure | Figure |
|---|---|
| LNG through the strait, 2025 | Over 112 bcm |
| Share of global LNG trade | About 19–20 per cent |
| Qatar’s exports via the strait | 93 per cent |
| UAE’s exports via the strait | 96 per cent |
| Qatari exports, 2025 | Over 112 bcm |
| Destination split | About 90 per cent Asia, just over 10 per cent Europe |
| Share of Asia’s LNG imports | About 27 per cent |
| Share of Europe’s LNG imports | About 7 per cent |
| Bangladesh, India and Pakistan | Almost two-thirds of their LNG, 2025 |
| Bypass capacity for LNG | Negligible |
| Hypothetical disruption | Over 300 mcm/d of global supplyDouble the 2021 average flow through Nord Stream. IEA. |
Why gas is the harder problem
Crude oil is fungible and can be moved by pipeline. If Gulf crude cannot leave through Hormuz, some of it leaves overland, and the barrels that do not get replaced to a degree by spare capacity elsewhere in the world at a price.
LNG is neither. Liquefaction trains are enormous fixed installations tied to specific export terminals, and the terminals that matter here — Ras Laffan above all — are inside the Persian Gulf. There is no pipeline out at anything like the relevant scale: the Dolphin pipeline carried almost 20.5 billion cubic metres to the UAE in 2025 with limited spare capacity, and Oman’s terminals, which do sit outside the strait, run at close to 100 per cent utilisation.
So 93 per cent of Qatar’s LNG and 96 per cent of the UAE’s goes out through the channel, and if the channel is constrained the gas stays in the ground. The IEA’s illustrative figure for a full disruption is a loss of over 300 million cubic metres a day from global supply — double the 2021 average flow through Nord Stream, which gives a sense of scale against a disruption people remember.
Who feels it first
Not, mostly, the countries that dominate the coverage. About 90 per cent of the strait’s LNG went to Asia in 2025 and just over 10 per cent to Europe, which is roughly 27 per cent of Asia’s LNG imports against 7 per cent of Europe’s.
The sharpest exposure is in South Asia. Bangladesh, India and Pakistan sourced almost two-thirds of their LNG through the strait in 2025, and gas generated half of Bangladesh’s electricity and a quarter of Pakistan’s in 2024. A gas supply shock there is a power supply shock, not a heating-bill shock.
That is also a price mechanism. Buyers with the deepest pockets outbid those without them in a tight spot market, so a Hormuz disruption tends to show up in Europe as higher gas prices and in South Asia as cargoes diverted away and load-shedding. Japan and South Korea sit in between: heavily dependent, but able to pay.
What Qatar has done about it
Not much it can do, which is the point. Qatar has no sea exit from the Gulf and no plausible overland route to a non-Gulf coast — a pipeline to the Gulf of Oman or the Arabian Sea would have to cross Saudi Arabia and the UAE or Iran, and the politics of that have never been workable.
What Qatar does have is diplomatic position. It has mediated between Washington and Tehran through 2026 — Iran’s September proposal for reopening the strait was passed through Doha — and when Iran announced transit exemptions on 4 November, Qatari vessels were reportedly exempted without a fee while Indian and Chinese ships pay one. For a state whose entire export economy depends on a waterway it does not control, being indispensable as an intermediary is the available strategy.
The transit permit regime and the exemptions are covered here.
Common questions
- Can Qatar export LNG without the Strait of Hormuz?
- Essentially no. Apart from pipeline deliveries to Kuwait and the UAE, all of its LNG leaves through the strait, and there is no alternative route at a relevant scale.
- What share of global LNG goes through the Strait of Hormuz?
- About a fifth — over 112 billion cubic metres in 2025, roughly 19 to 20 per cent of global LNG trade, on IEA figures.
- Which countries are most exposed to a Hormuz LNG disruption?
- Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, which took almost two-thirds of their LNG through the strait in 2025 and rely on gas for a large share of power generation. Japan and South Korea are also heavily dependent but better placed to outbid for alternative cargoes.
- Does Europe depend on Hormuz LNG?
- Less than Asia. Strait LNG was about 7 per cent of Europe’s imports in 2025 against 27 per cent of Asia’s. Europe feels a disruption mainly through global price rather than physical shortage.