Which Gulf economies the strait exposes, and how badly

Six exporters use the channel and their positions are not comparable. Two have options; four do not; and the one controlling the waterway is among the four.

MeasureFigure
Saudi Arabia, 20256.23 million b/d through the straitCrude 5.43, products 0.80. Has the East-West pipeline.
Iraq3.63 million b/dCrude 3.32, products 0.31. No alternative.
UAE3.24 million b/dCrude 2.02, products 1.22. Has the Fujairah pipeline.
Iran2.41 million b/dCrude 1.69, products 0.72. Jask effectively non-operational.
Kuwait2.37 million b/dCrude 1.40, products 0.97. No alternative.
Qatar1.43 million b/d oil, plus 93% of its LNGNo alternative.
Saudi–Kuwaiti Neutral Zone0.35 million b/d
Bahrain0.21 million b/d productsNo alternative.

The split that matters

Every Gulf exporter uses the strait, but they divide sharply into those with an overland route and those without, and the IEA is explicit about it: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain rely on the strait for the vast majority of their oil exports, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have some routes that bypass it.

The two with options are also the two largest, which matters for the global supply picture but not for the states without them. For Iraq at 3.63 million barrels a day, Kuwait at 2.37 and Bahrain at 0.21, a constrained strait is an existential revenue problem with no engineering answer. The pipelines and their real capacity are here.

Qatar: the most extreme position

Qatar exported 1.43 million barrels a day of oil and products through the strait in 2025, which is not large. Its exposure is gas, and it is close to total: 93 per cent of its LNG exports transit the channel, with the remainder going by pipeline to Kuwait, against over 112 billion cubic metres of total exports.

There is no fix available. A pipeline to a non-Gulf coast would have to cross Saudi Arabia and the UAE or Iran, and that has never been politically workable. Why gas has no workaround.

What Qatar has instead is position. It mediated between Washington and Tehran through 2026 — Iran’s September reopening proposal went through Doha — and when Iran announced transit exemptions on 4 November, Qatari vessels were reportedly exempted without a fee. For a state in that position, indispensability is the strategy.

Iran: controlling a chokepoint it cannot avoid

This is the under-appreciated constraint on the whole situation. Iran exported about 2.41 million barrels a day through the strait in 2025 and has no working alternative: the Jask terminal on the Gulf of Oman has a nominal million barrels a day of capacity and is effectively non-operational, its only test load having been in late 2024.

So the state controlling transit is also among the states most dependent on it, which is a large part of why the 2026 closure became a permit regime rather than staying a closure. A permissioning system preserves Iranian exports in a way a blockade does not.

The US naval blockade of Iranian ports attacks exactly this vulnerability from the other direction. CENTCOM said in October 2026 that it had halted roughly $25 billion of Iranian crude exports.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE: partial insulation, differently shaped

Saudi Arabia has the larger bypass — 3 to 5 million barrels a day of spare capacity on the East-West pipeline — and the weaker one, because it delivers to Red Sea terminals whose own exit through Bab el-Mandeb is disrupted. The rerouting is visible in the data: Bab el-Mandeb oil flow rose from 5.4 to 8.1 million barrels a day between the fourth quarter of 2025 and the second of 2026 as Saudi crude went to Yanbu instead.

The UAE has the smaller and better one. Up to 700,000 barrels a day of spare capacity on the pipeline to Fujairah, which sits on the Gulf of Oman with open ocean ahead of it and no further chokepoint. The UAE also moves 1.22 million barrels a day of refined products, a larger product share than its neighbours, and sends 96 per cent of its LNG through the strait — so its insulation is real on crude and thin on gas.

Neither is close to covered. Saudi Arabia moved 6.23 million barrels a day through the strait in 2025 against 3 to 5 million of pipeline headroom pointed at a constrained sea.

Common questions

Which Gulf country is most exposed to a Hormuz closure?
Qatar, in the sense that 93 per cent of its LNG exports have no alternative route. By oil volume with no alternative, Iraq at 3.63 million barrels a day.
Does Saudi Arabia need the Strait of Hormuz?
For most of its exports, yes. It moved 6.23 million barrels a day through the strait in 2025 against 3 to 5 million barrels a day of spare pipeline capacity to the Red Sea — and that pipeline’s terminals face their own chokepoint.
Why does Iran not have an alternative route?
It built one — the Jask terminal on the Gulf of Oman, with a nominal million barrels a day — but it is effectively non-operational, with only a single test load in late 2024.

Sources

Strait Insider is a reference site, not a news wire. Developing events are summarised with a link to the reporting they come from; follow the source for the current position.