Two chokepoints at once
The workaround for one runs into the other. This is the part of the 2026 picture that most analysis, including earlier versions of these pages, got wrong.
Reviewed 9 November 2026
| Measure | Figure |
|---|---|
| Hormuz flow, Q4 2025 → Q2 2026 | 21.6 → 4.9 million b/d |
| Bab el-Mandeb flow, same period | 5.4 → 8.1 million b/dRose because Saudi crude rerouted to Yanbu. EIA. |
| Petroline spare capacity | 3–5 million b/dDelivers to the Red Sea. |
| ADCOP spare capacity | Up to 0.7 million b/dDelivers to Fujairah, outside both chokepoints. |
| Bypass capacity not exposed to a second chokepoint | Up to about 0.7 million b/d |
| Cape of Good Hope detour | Over 20 additional days |
The mistake worth naming
Almost every account of Hormuz bypass capacity, this site’s earlier pages included, presents the same arithmetic: roughly 20 million barrels a day normally transit the strait, pipelines can take 3.5 to 5.5 million, therefore about a quarter is covered.
The arithmetic is right and the conclusion is wrong, because it treats all bypass capacity as equivalent. It is not. Most of that capacity — the 3 to 5 million barrels a day of headroom on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline — delivers to Red Sea terminals, principally Yanbu. Oil arriving at Yanbu has left the Persian Gulf, which is what the pipeline is for, but it is now in a sea with two exits: north through Suez, or south through Bab el-Mandeb.
When Bab el-Mandeb is also disrupted, that capacity has not escaped the problem. It has swapped one chokepoint for another. The only bypass capacity genuinely clear of all of this is the UAE’s pipeline to Fujairah, which faces the Gulf of Oman — and that is up to 700,000 barrels a day, not 5 million.
What the data shows
The EIA’s chokepoint figures for the second quarter of 2026 make the mechanism visible in a way that argument cannot. Hormuz carried 4.9 million barrels a day against 21.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2025. Over the same period Bab el-Mandeb carried 8.1 million, up from 5.4 million — and the EIA attributes the rise specifically to Saudi Arabia rerouting crude via the East-West pipeline to Yanbu.
So the Hormuz disruption did not only reduce flow through Hormuz. It increased load on Bab el-Mandeb by roughly 2.7 million barrels a day, at exactly the time when Houthi forces were consolidating control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast. One disruption fed the other.
The Cape of Good Hope absorbs some of this, at more than 20 additional days per voyage, which is why a Bab el-Mandeb problem is expensive rather than catastrophic. But the Cape is not an alternative to Hormuz — it is an alternative to Suez, and it only becomes relevant once a cargo is already out of the Gulf.
Why serial constraints behave differently
Two independent risks in parallel are additive: if one route closes, use the other. Two risks in series are multiplicative in the bad direction: a cargo must clear both, so the probability of a clean passage is the product of two probabilities and the cost is the sum of two premiums.
That is the situation for Gulf crude moving by pipeline to the Red Sea. It pays the pipeline tariff, then the Red Sea war-risk premium, then either the Suez toll or the Cape detour. Each step is survivable; together they compress the margin to the point where the cargo may not move at all.
It also means that relieving one chokepoint does less than expected while the other is constrained, and relieving both does more than the sum of relieving each. Policy and market commentary that treats them as separate files is mis-specifying the problem.
What this changes about the alternatives
Three practical revisions follow, and they are the reason this page exists.
First, discount the Saudi bypass. Its 3 to 5 million barrels a day of spare capacity is real but conditional on the Red Sea being usable, and should not be counted as unconditional relief.
Second, revalue Fujairah. The UAE’s pipeline is much the smaller of the two and the only one whose loading point has open ocean ahead of it. Up to 700,000 barrels a day of unconditional bypass capacity is a more useful number than 5.5 million of conditional capacity. The pipeline comparison.
Third, the gas picture is unaffected because it was already hopeless. 93 per cent of Qatar’s LNG has no route out but Hormuz, with no Red Sea option to be complicated in the first place.
Common questions
- Does the Saudi East-West pipeline solve the Hormuz problem?
- Partially and conditionally. It moves crude out of the Persian Gulf, but delivers to Red Sea terminals whose exit through Bab el-Mandeb is itself disrupted. Its relief value depends on the Red Sea being usable.
- Which bypass route avoids both chokepoints?
- Only the UAE’s pipeline to Fujairah, on the Gulf of Oman. Up to about 700,000 barrels a day of spare capacity, with open ocean ahead of it.
- Why did Bab el-Mandeb oil traffic rise while Hormuz fell?
- Because Saudi Arabia rerouted crude through the East-West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea, and those cargoes then transit Bab el-Mandeb. The EIA attributes the increase from 5.4 to 8.1 million barrels a day specifically to that.